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Abstract
Although performance-based contracts have become increasingly popular in child welfare,
administrators are developing these contracts with little empirically guided information about how
internal work conditions may influence the services families receive. This study examines how
child welfare caseworker role overload moderates associations between child welfare agencies’
use of performance-based contracting and services provided to families. Analyses using data from
the National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being suggest that when caseworkers
experience high role overload, use of performance-based contracts may decrease caregivers’
likelihood of receiving necessary social and behavioral health services. These findings and their
implications are discussed.
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Introduction
Since the late 1990s, state and local governments have reconfigured how child welfare
services are delivered in response to rising numbers of children in foster care, concern over
the costs of child welfare service provision, and pressure to meet federal performance
standards under the Child and Family Service Review (CFSR) process established under the
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) (Childrens Bureau, 2005; Gao, 1997; Yilmaz, Hoo,
Nagowski, Rueben, & Tannenwald, 2007). Public efforts at reform have largely involved
privatizing services under the assumption that private child welfare agencies will more
efficiently and effectively serve families than public bureaucracies (Van Slyke, 2003;
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Wright & Radel, 2007). Restructuring has also involved manipulating the payment
structures associated with government contracts so that contractors share some of the
financial risks, or cost uncertainties of child welfare service provision (C McCullough &
Lee, 2007). As a result, performance-based contracts, which provide contracted agencies
with financial incentives and/or sanctions to achieve selected outcomes, have become
particularly popular in child welfare (C McCullough & Schmitt, 2003; Wulczyn, 2000).
Performance-based assessments in child welfare have generally been limited to the most
easily measured outcome, permanency or the placement of youth into a stable residence
(Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim, 2004; Kearney & McEwen, 2007; C. McCullough, 2004; C
McCullough & Lee, 2007; Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004). Almost all current performance-based
contracts within child welfare focus on facilitating faster permanency by providing financial
incentives (either through rewards and/or sanctions) for contractors to move children quickly
out of foster care and into a permanent setting, whether through parent-child reunification,
kinship foster care, or adoption.
However, because child welfare services do not meet many of the conditions believed
necessary for optimal use of performance-based contracting, these contracts may have
unanticipated consequences (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stroh, Brett, Baumann, & Reilly, 1996). For
example, child welfare outcomes such as safety and well-being are difficult to measure
(Tilbury, 2004). Child welfare activities also frequently involve joint or team efforts, making
it difficult to assign responsibility for outcomes to one individual or agency. Moreover,
factors in the external environment contribute heavily to variation in child welfare agency
performance such as challenges related to inter-organizational collaboration or limited
provider availability (Child Welfare League of America, 1989; Van Slyke, 2003; Wells &
Johnson, 2001). In high-risk environments, shifting financial risk to contractors may not be
optimal because it provides incentives for child welfare contractors to reduce their own risk
exposure, regardless of whether their actions have a detrimental effect on desired
performance outcomes in the long term (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998). This problem may be
magnified in the organizations with which child welfare agencies frequently contract, which
already tend to not have many “slack,” or excess, resources to protect themselves from
financial uncertainty (C. McCullough, 2004; Van Slyke, 2003). Financial risk may therefore
push these organizations into implementing strategies for conserving and rationing limited
resources, such as understaffing, that make it very difficult for workers to employ best
practices (Lipsky, 1980; Prottas, 1979).
To some extent, child welfare administrators have tried to compensate for the vulnerability
of the agencies with which they contract by including risk-mitigating strategies in their
performance-based contracts. For example, performance-based contracts may include
catastrophic stop-loss provisions or risk-pools. However, such provisions do not address the
underlying issue, which is that performance-based contracts focused exclusively on
permanency may not provide caseworkers with incentives to follow through on aspects of
case management other than those directly related to time to permanent placement. For
example, even though caseworkers’ training curricula emphasizes a family-oriented
approach, evidence suggests that caseworkers often find working with permanent caregivers
time-consuming (Smith & Donovan, 2003). Meeting permanent caregivers’ needs often
requires provision of multiple services, including mental health, substance abuse, and social
services such as housing or legal aid (Choi & Ryan, 2007; Cleaver, Unell, & Aldgate, 2000;
Jones, 1998). While such services can result in improved outcomes for caregivers and their
children (DePanfilis & Zuravin, 2002; Marsh, Ryan, Choi, & Testa, 2006), the time involved
in caregiver service provision can be problematic for caseworkers because timelines for
provision of mental health and substance abuse treatment often conflict with preferred child
welfare timelines for establishing permanency (Drabble, 2007; Young & Gardner, 2002).
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Consequently, pressure to meet permanency deadlines can cause caseworkers to de-
prioritize this work (McBeath & Meezan, 2010; Smith & Donovan, 2003). Performance-
based contracts that emphasize speed of child permanency placements and direct caseworker
efforts towards that goal may further encourage overworked caseworkers to de-prioritize
permanent caregiver engagement and service receipt.
There is currently relatively little empirical evidence as to how performance-based
contracting within child welfare influences child welfare outcomes other than permanence.
However, the few existing studies, all of which have occurred in county- or state-specific
settings, suggest that while financial incentives positively influence contractors to more
swiftly establish permanency, they may also promote these goals at the expense of other
outcomes (McBeath & Meezan, 2008; Meezan & McBeath, 2008). In particular, findings
indicated that factors within the contracting agencies may moderate the influence of
performance-based contracting on child welfare agency outcomes. For example, research on
a performance-based initiative in a Michigan county found that relative to children in
agencies reimbursed through fee-for-service contracts, children served by agencies with
performance-based contracts received fewer non-therapeutic services such as case
management or social services, and were less likely to be reunified with their families
(McBeath & Meezan, 2008; Meezan & McBeath, 2008). Reunifying children with their
families required greater service efforts on the part of caseworkers than other permanency
outcomes, such as adoption or kinship care; therefore it was speculated that child welfare
agencies’ response to performance environments affected client outcomes partially through
the services provided by caseworkers (McBeath & Meezan, 2010).
Currently, child welfare agencies in over half of states in the U.S. have experimented with
some form of performance-based contracting, and more plan to do so in the future
(Blackstone, et al., 2004; Kearney & McEwen, 2007; Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004). Research in
other social service sectors has shown that the effect of performance-based contracting on
desired outcomes is influenced by the working conditions of the people charged with
providing services under these contracts (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989;
Stroh, et al., 1996). However, most child welfare agencies are developing performance-
based contracts within child welfare with very little empirically guided information about
how these conditions may influence desired outcomes.
There is a growing awareness within child welfare of how factors within the internal agency
environment – such as caseload, supervisor support, and peer support – influence
caseworker practices and client outcomes (Glisson & Green, 2006; Glisson & Hemmelgarn,
1998; J. Yoo, 2002; J Yoo & Brooks, 2005). However, there is still a lot to learn about how
these conditions moderate the relationship between use of performance-based contracts and
desired child welfare outcomes.
This study contributes to the literature by using data from a national survey of children and
families involved with the child welfare system to examine associations between use of
performance-based contracting, the internal child welfare agency environment, and service
outcomes in child welfare. Specifically, we hypothesize that caseworker role overload, or
having too many demands given the time available to satisfy them (Coverman, 1989;
Harrison, 1980; Hecht, 2001; Malm, 2001), negatively moderates the relationship between
performance-based contracting and service provision. Services such as case management,
in-home services, and permanent caregiver receipt of necessary behavioral health and social
services were selected to determine whether families’ multidimensional needs were being
met, and also because of their association with child welfare outcomes such as parent-child
reunification (Gao, 2004; McCarthy, Van Buren, & Irvine, 2007; Miller, Fisher, Fetrow, &
Jordan, 2006)
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Data were drawn from the Child Protective Services (CPS) cohort of the National Survey of
Child and Adolescent Well-Being (NSCAW), the only national study of children in the U.S.
child welfare system (Dowd et al., 2004). NSCAW was funded by the Administration for
Children and Families within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and was
carried out by Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International. A two-stage stratified design
was used to sample children in 92 primary sampling units within 46 states throughout the
U.S. Assessments of child and family context and well-being were conducted through
interviews with each child, the current caregiver, and the child welfare caseworker at
baseline (Wave 1, with first interviews conducted between October 1999 and December
2000), at 12 months (Wave 2), at 18 months (Wave 3), and at 36 months (Wave 4) after the
close of the investigation or assessment. Although a fifth wave was collected at 48 months,
these data were omitted from the current analyses due to the high attrition rate once youth
reached 18 years of age.
Weighted data were used in the current analyses. Participation was adjusted by the
probability of selecting the child’s county of residence and then the probability of selecting
the child given that the child’s county of residence was sampled (Dowd, et al., 2004). When
incorporated in analyses, these weights yield approximately design-unbiased and consistent
estimates for the corresponding population quantities (Christ, Biemer, & Wiesen, 2007;
Pfefferman, Skinner, Holmes, Goldstein, & Rasbash, 1998). The result is an almost
nationally representative sample of children who have had encounters with the child welfare
system, excluding only four states whose human subjects’ requirements exceeded the
resources of the NSCAW study to accommodate.
Child welfare agency directors were interviewed in Wave 1 about agency use of
performance-based measures linked with financial incentives and/or sanctions. Child
welfare caseworkers were interviewed about role overload in Wave 2. Additional contextual
data were merged with the NSCAW data using county-level identifiers from the 2000 Area
Resource File (ARF), the Child Welfare League of America National Data Analysis System
(NDAS), the National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (NSSATS), and from
data on county-level mental health shortages (Thomas, Ellis, Konrad, Holzer, & Morrissey,
2009). Given the restricted nature of the NSCAW data, the merge was conducted by RTI
International at our request.
Analytic samples
At baseline, the initial NSCAW sample included 1664 permanent caregivers whose families
were assessed as requiring child welfare agency-funded services and who were served by
child welfare agencies in which the agency director provided information about the agency’s
use of performance-based contracting. For 622 of these 1664 caregivers, the assigned
services caseworker was interviewed about his or her work environment and the services
provided to the index family. The final analytic sample for the three models predicting
caseworker efforts spent on case management and in-home service provision, and permanent
caregivers’ receipt of social services was therefore 622 permanent caregivers and their
services caseworkers nested within 54 county CPS agencies.
Models examining permanent caregivers’ receipt of behavioral health services were further
restricted to include only permanent caregivers who needed each type of service (mental
health or substance abuse treatment). Application of this restriction reduced the sample for
models predicting receipt of mental health services to 461 caregivers and the sample for
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models predicting substance abuse treatment to 355 caregivers, each nested within 54 county
CPS agencies.
Listwise deletion for item missingness in each model reduced the final analytic sample for
models predicting caseworker hours and permanent caregivers’ receipt of social services to
between 515 and 557 permanent caregivers and caseworkers; the final analytic sample for
the mental health model to 239 caregivers; and the final analytic sample for the substance
abuse treatment model to 143 caregivers nested within 54 county CPS agencies. The
majority of item missing was attributed to the caregiver health insurance variable, which
was only available for 254 of 461 caregivers in the mental health model, and for 150 of 355
caregivers in the substance abuse treatment model.
Given that sampling weights within NSCAW incorporate survey non-response but not item
non-response (Dowd, et al., 2004; Little, 1988), weighted t-tests were conducted on all
model variables to determine if the data were missing at random or if a correction for sample
selection bias would be required (Allison, 2002; Lee & Marsh, 2000). Results indicated that
the cases in the final analytic sample for all models did not differ significantly from those
excluded due to missing values for other variables; therefore, it was concluded that the
missing data were ignorable.
Measures
Behavioral health service need—Caregivers’ need for behavioral health services was
based on each investigative caseworker’s assessment of the caregiver’s need for either
mental health services or substance abuse treatment at baseline (Wave 1), as well as on
whether the caregiver was assessed as being depressed or substance dependent (i.e. alcohol
and/or drug dependent) using screening scales from the World Health Organization
Composite International Diagnostic Interview Short-Form (CIDI-SF) (Kessler, Andrews,
Mroczek, Ustun, & Wittchen, 1998; Walters, Kessler, Nelson, & Mroczek, 2002). The
version of the CIDI-SF used in NSCAW provided depression diagnoses based on Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994), and substance-dependence diagnoses based on Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IIIR criteria (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987). Psychometric research indicates good test-retest and inter-rater
reliability and diagnostic validity of the CIDI long-form scale (Wittchen, 1994), as well as
high concordance between diagnostic classifications obtained using CIDI-SF and the longer
measure (Andrews & Peters, 1998; Rubio-Stipec, Peters, & Andrews, 1999).
Services received by children and families in child welfare—Five dependent
variables were used to examine the services received by children and families in child
welfare (Table 1). These variables were selected to reflect the child welfare agency’s efforts
to promote family well-being, and reflect both caseworker practices and the actual services
received by permanent caregivers. These variables were: (1) the average number of hours
per month the caseworker spent on case management and service referrals for the family; (2)
the average number of hours of in-home services the family received each month; (3) the
number of social services – such as legal aid, food from a community source, emergency
shelter or housing, child care, and referrals for job-related services, organized support
groups, or home management training – received by caregivers since entering the child
welfare system (Waves 2–4); (4) whether the permanent caregiver received any mental
health services since entering the child welfare system (Waves 2–4); and (5) whether the
permanent caregiver received any substance abuse services since entering the child welfare
system (Waves 2–4). Data on average caseworker hours were collected once, twelve months
after families entered the child welfare system (Wave 2). Caregiver service receipt was
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measured across multiple waves to account for the amount of time often required for
caseworkers to facilitate families’ access to necessary social and behavioral health services.
Permanent caregivers’ receipt of mental health services was set equal to 1 if caregivers
reported receiving outpatient counseling or therapy; day treatment or partial hospitalization;
or family counseling; or if caseworkers indicated that permanent caregiver received mental
health services as a result of referral by the child welfare agency. Permanent caregivers’
receipt of substance abuse was also based on both permanent caregivers’ and caseworkers’
reports of whether any services were received. The rationale for including both permanent
caregiver and caseworker responses was to account for the possibility that caregivers might
under-report services and caseworkers might not be fully aware of the extent of caregiver
service utilization.
Performance-based contracting and caseworker role overload—A 1/0 measure
of the main effect of performance-based contracting was based on the child welfare agency
director’s report of whether the agency used performance-based measures linked to financial
incentives or sanctions. This information was collected only once, at baseline (Wave 1). The
main effect caseworker role overload was measured using a validated Likert scale (α = .82)
based on caseworker responses to eight perceptual items about the demands within their
work environment (James & Sells, 1981; Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970). These questions
were asked of the caseworkers providing services to families and were collected once, in
Wave 2. Caseworkers were assessed to have high role overload if their value for role
overload was at or above the sample mean; values lower than the mean were assessed as low
role overload.
Given that the coefficients of interaction terms within nonlinear models do not accurately
represent interaction effects (Ai & Norton, 2003; Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004), we instead
used two dichotomous variables to test how caseworker role overload moderated the
association between performance-based contracting and each outcome. The first variable
was set =1 if the child welfare agency used performance-based contracting and the
caseworker reported high role overload. The second variable was set =1 if the child welfare
agency used performance-based contracting and the caseworker reported low role overload.
Inclusion of these two dichotomous variables tested for potentially differing effects of
performance-based contracting given high and low caseworker role overload respectively,
relative to situations where performance-based contracting was not used.
Other covariates—Two agency-level control variables were included to account for
potential confounders of the associations between focal predictors and service provision.
The first variable, drawn from 2000 Area Resource File, indicated whether the agency was
located within a non-metropolitan statistical area, and served as a control for rural-urban
differences in service provision and as a proxy for organizational size (Alexander, Nank, &
Stivers, 1999; Johnston & Romzek, 1999). The second variable was a control for local
behavioral health provider availability. This variable was operationalized differently
depending on the model. For all models except the one involving permanent caregiver
receipt of substance abuse treatment, this variable was operationalized as the percentage of
unmet mental health needs within the county, including those for providers with and without
prescription authority (Thomas, et al., 2009). For the model involving permanent caregiver
receipt of substance abuse treatment, data from the 2000 National Survey of Substance
Abuse Treatment Services on the total number of behavioral health care facilities in the
county, which was collected by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration (SAMHSA) were utilized as a measure
of local provider availability. This variable was log-transformed for the analyses to
accommodate anticipated diminishing returns to scale.
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Certain baseline factors known to influence families’ interactions with the child welfare
system were also added as controls. These factors are type of maltreatment, child gender,
child age, whether the child was identified as having special needs, caregiver’s relationship
with the child, caregiver race, caregiver insurance, whether the caregiver had a behavioral
health problem, and whether the child welfare case had closed since the initial investigation.
Child special needs was operationalized as whether the child had chronic health problems
and/or a clinical score (65 or above) on either the internalizing or externalizing scales of the
Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL), a standardized instrument for assessing the presence of
behavioral health problems in children (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983). Caregivers were
assessed as having a behavioral health problem if the investigative caseworker assessed the
permanent caregiver as having either mental health or substance abuse problems at baseline
or if the caregiver was assessed as being depressed or substance dependent (i.e. alcohol and/
or drug dependent) using the CIDI-SF (Kessler, et al., 1998; Walters, et al., 2002). In the
behavioral health models, which were restricted on this assessment of need, this variable
was replaced by a measure of caregiver comorbidity, which indicated whether the caregiver
had both mental health and substance abuse problems.
Analysis plan
NSCAW data have a hierarchical structure, with children, caregivers, and caseworkers
nested within child welfare agencies. Consequently, we first used unconditional multilevel
models (not shown) to examine the degree to which child welfare agency-level factors
contributed to the total variance observed in each dependent variable. Results of the
unconditional multilevel models indicated that for all of the count variables (caseworker
time on case management and in-home service provision for families, and the number of
supportive services received by permanent caregivers) there was not sufficient variance in
outcomes (ICC<5%) due to agency-level factors to support the use of multilevel modeling.
The remaining dependent variables were dichotomous, and while the ICC for these variables
were ≥5%, the values were still relatively low (between 6–8%), suggesting that agency-level
factors contributed only slightly to these service outcomes as well. In addition to the small
amount of agency-level variance, the analytic sample contained a relatively modest number
of level-2 units (54 child welfare agencies). With unbalanced data such as NSCAW,
estimation of coefficients and standard errors in multilevel models rely on large-sample
theory. Particularly with binary dependent variables, a small sample of level-2 units (<100)
can result in biased estimates premised on inaccurate assumptions about variable
distributions (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Given both the modest ICC and number of
level-2 units, all models were analyzed as single-level models, adjusting for the potential
clustering of caseworkers and permanent caregivers within child welfare agencies.
Analyses were conducted using the Stata 10.0 svy module (StataCorp, 2007). The svy
module accounts for the complex survey design of the data, accommodating stratification,
clustering of caregivers and their caseworkers within agencies, and probability weights. The
link function used for each model reflected the nature of the dependent variable: negative
binomial for the average hours per month the caseworker spent on case management and
referrals or on in-home service provision, logistic for dichotomous variables such as
caregiver receipt of mental health and substance abuse services, and Poisson for the number
of supportive services received by permanent caregivers.
Two models were run for each dependent variable. In the first model, performance-based
contracting and caseworker role overload were included as separate covariates in order to
identify the main effects of these variables upon each type of service use. In the second
model for each dependent variable, the main effects for performance-based contracting and
role overload were replaced by two dichotomous predictors: (1) agency use of performance-
based contracting when caseworkers reported high role overload and (2) agency use of
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performance-based contracting when caseworkers reported low role overload. Using these
combined measures revealed the different effects of performance-based contracting on
service utilization given high vs. low caseworker role overload, relative to the absence of
performance-based contracting. To allow for these relative comparisons, coefficient
estimates for all models were transformed to either odds ratios (for logistic regression) or
incidence rate ratios (for Poisson and negative binomial). These are expressed as the relative
odds and relative frequency of occurrence, respectively, in the dependent variable given a
one-unit change in the independent variable (Aschengrau & Seage, 2003).
Power calculations conducted using the Optimal Design software determined that in the
models not restricted based on caregiver need for behavioral health services, there was
sufficient power to detect a medium effect size (>=0.5) at a significance level (α) of 0.05
(Spybrook, Raudenbush, Liu, Congdon, & Martinez, 2008). For the models restricted based
on caregiver need for behavioral health services, there was sufficient power to detect an
effect size of 0.6 or higher. Finally, bivariate correlations among study variables, followed
by tolerance checks for any correlations >.4, did not indicate any problematic collinearity.
This secondary data analysis was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the lead
author’s home institution. The original data collection was approved by an Institutional
Review Board at RTI International.
Results
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all study measures. The mean time caseworkers
reported spending on case management for a family each month was 5.26 hours and the
mean time caseworkers spent each month on direct in-home service provision for a family
was 7.74 hours. On average, permanent caregivers reported receiving only 1 out of 6
possible social services, with child care and referrals for job-related services (not shown)
being the most common. Of the caregivers assessed as needing such services at baseline
(461 of 622 for mental health; 355 of 622 for substance abuse treatment), approximately
46% had received some mental health services and approximately 48% received substance
abuse treatment since entering the child welfare system.
Approximately 25% of permanent caregivers were served by child welfare agencies that
used performance-based contracting; at the agency level, 16 of the 54 (30%) child welfare
agencies used performance-based contracting and the remainder did not. The mean level of
role overload reported by caseworkers within the sample was 3.79 on a 1–5 scale. On
average, 16% of families received services from child welfare agencies that used
performance-based contracting and from a caseworker with high role overload;
approximately 9% of families were served by child welfare agencies that used performance-
based contracting and had a service caseworker with low role overload.
Tables 2–4 provide model results for caseworker hours spent in service provision, the
number of supportive services received by permanent caregivers, and caregivers’ likelihood
of receiving behavioral health services. The first model for each dependent variable shows
the main effects of performance-based contracting and caseworker role overload,
respectively. The second model for each dependent variable shows the effects of
performance-based contracting under conditions of high versus low caseworker role
overload. Use of performance-based contracting was negatively associated with average
caseworker hours spent on in-home service provision (IRR 0.58, p<0.01) and with odds of
mental health service receipt (OR=0.29, p<0.05), holding caseworker role overload constant.
Similarly, caseworkers with higher role overload reported spending less time on case
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management and referrals for caregivers, although the association was not significant at
alpha=0.05 (IRR=0.75, p<0.10).
The pattern of results becomes stronger when performance-based contracting is combined
with caseworker role overload. The combination of performance-based contracting and
caseworker high role overload decreased caseworker hours spent on case management and
service referrals by a factor of 0.65, or by −35% (p<0.05) and the number of supportive
services received by caregivers by a factor of 0.62, or by −38% (p<0.01). Similarly, the
negative association between use of performance-based contracting and caseworker hours
on in-home service provision was stronger when the caseworker reported high role overload
(IRR 0.49, p<0.01) than when the caseworker reported low role overload (IRR 0.69,
p<0.05).
In contrast, the combination of performance-based contracting and low role overload
increased caseworkers’ hours spent in case management and service referrals by a factor of
1.43, or 43.1% (p<0.05). This result represented the only significant positive association
between performance-based contracting and service outcomes.
Discussion
This study investigated whether caseworker role overload moderated the relationship
between performance-based contracting and service provision to families involved with
child welfare agencies. This issue is important because currently, almost all performance-
based contracts within child welfare focus on permanency, or the placement of children and
youth into stable residences. However, contracts linked only to this outcome may cause
caseworkers to pursue swift permanency placements by providing less intensive case
management and/or pursuing permanency options that require less engagement with
permanent caregivers. Evidence in the literature suggests that caseworkers perceive parent-
child reunification as particularly time-consuming because it requires them to provide more
services than other permanency options (McBeath & Meezan, 2010). Particularly when
faced with pressure to quickly achieve permanency for a larger number of cases,
caseworkers may choose to focus on other permanency options instead. For example,
despite evidence that children placed with relatives take longer to reunify with parents, are
less likely to be adopted, and receive fewer services and financial support than children
placed with non-related caregivers (Cuddeback, 2004; McBeath & Meezan, 2010), kinship
foster care has become an increasingly common placement option.
The current study findings were largely consistent with this logic: use of performance-based
contracting in and of itself was associated with significantly fewer caseworker hours spent
on in-home service provision to families, as well as significantly lower odds of caregivers
receiving needed mental health services. Both of these outcomes require caseworkers to
spend a significant amount of time working with permanent caregivers; as suggested by the
negative associations with these outcomes, child welfare agencies’ use of performance-
based contracting may cause caseworkers to de-prioritize such efforts.
Study findings also indicate that the consequences of performance-based contracting may
depend on agency-level factors in ways that policymakers may not currently be taking into
consideration. In this study, the combination of performance-based contracting and high
caseworker role overload was associated with significantly fewer caseworker hours spent on
case management. Under these conditions, caregivers also received fewer social services;
while not statistically significant at the 5% level, results from the behavioral health models
indicate that caregivers had lower odds of receiving substance abuse treatment as well.
These findings suggest that when designing performance-based contracts, child welfare
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agencies should consider the potential effect of internal work conditions on the effectiveness
of such contracts. Many caseworkers operate under severe time pressures and resource
constraints, and may already seek ways to make their work more efficient by focusing
primarily on outcomes for which they are held accountable (Jayaratne & Chess, 1984; Smith
& Donovan, 2003). In situations in which caseworkers are overburdened, the use of
performance-based contracts may provide incentives for them to focus their efforts on
certain outcomes to the detriment of others. While the current study could not determine
whether caseworkers experienced high role overload prior to the implementation of
performance-based contracting, study findings suggest that the combination of the two is
negatively associated with certain outcomes and should be monitored closely.
Policymakers and managers could help address this issue by re-structuring performance-
based contracts to ensure that caseworkers are not focusing on permanence at the expense of
other important means of supporting child well-being. More explicit emphasis on case
management processes or on a broader range of outcomes might not address the ongoing
issue of caseworker role overload, but could help reduce the risk that over-burdened staff
will focus their efforts too narrowly. Including extra incentives for achievement of long-term
placement stability rather than simply rewarding swift permanency placements could also be
helpful.
Investment in supervisory training that emphasizes the importance of ensuring service
provision to both biological parents and children could also help balance caseworker
priorities. Evidence suggests that caseworkers do not transfer skills learned in training— e.g.
taking a family--oriented approach—to the workplace when the work environment does not
nurture such skills (Gregoire, Propp, & Poertner, 1998). Child welfare agency managers, and
particularly frontline supervisors, play an important role in shaping caseworker priorities
and practices (Gregoire, et al., 1998; Landsman, 2001; McBeath, Briggs, & Aisenberg,
2009; Smith, 2005). Supervisors trained to support their caseworkers in taking a more
holistic approach could help mitigate the effects of role overload on caseworker practices.
Another possibility might be to adjust performance-based contracts to account for
organizations’ different work environments and/or service capacities. For example,
administrators could design contracts that take into account child welfare agency caseloads
and staffing ratios, or that adjust the expected timeframe for permanency placements based
on the availability of local health and human services. Certainly the positive association
between use of performance-based contracting and case management practices in our study
when the caseworker reported low role overload suggest that performance-based contracting
may accomplish desired results when these variables are accounted for.
One challenge in interpreting results derives from the lack of granularity of the measure of
agencies’ use of performance-based contracting. Child welfare agency directors were asked
only whether their agency used these mechanisms; additional details about contract design
were not available. Therefore, we did not know whether provision of permanent caregiver
services was also included in the contract, or the size of the fiscal incentive or sanction
provided. In addition, the nature of performance-based contracting may have changed since
these data were collected. Given the growing use of such contracts within the U.S. child
welfare system (e.g. Join Hands for Children, 2009), it will be important for future research
to continue examining how different types of performance-based contracts affect outcomes
under varying agency and contextual conditions.
Despite these limitations, our study is the first to examine associations between use of
performance-based contracting, role overload – a key factor in the internal agency
environment – and service outcomes in child welfare. Our findings indicate that caseworker
Chuang et al. Page 10













role overload may moderate associations between child welfare agencies’ use of
performance-based contracting and service outcomes for families. While there is a need for
additional research in this area, policymakers and child welfare agency administrators may
wish to consider modifying existing contracts to emphasize case management processes and
family well-being outcomes, or at least to take into account current child welfare agency
caseloads and staffing ratios.
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